Joint close air support in the low intensity conflict by Binney, Michael W.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2003-06
Joint close air support in the low intensity conflict
Binney, Michael W.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/1022




Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 









 Thesis Advisor:         James A. Russell  























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 
0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per 
response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, 
gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of 
information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this 
collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington 
headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis 
Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, 
Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave 
blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
June 2003 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE:  Joint Close Air Support in the 
Low Intensity Conflict 
6. AUTHOR(S) Maj Michael W. Binney 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
     AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do 
not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is 
unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
During the Gulf War, millions of people around the globe, courtesy of CNN, 
witnessed the seemingly massive use of precision-guided weapons against Iraqi targets 
in the largest air campaign since World War II. Most of the missions were flown 
against Iraqi targets with no friendly forces on the ground. This type of air 
campaign is known as Deep Air Support, or ‘DAS’. Equally as important, but receiving 
less spectacular news coverage, is Close Air support, or ‘CAS’. When conducting CAS 
missions, the chance for ‘Friendly Fire’ incidents, injuring or killing your own 
troops on the ground, increases dramatically as compared to DAS missions. This may 
seem to be an obvious deduction since there are no friendly troops on the ground 
during a DAS mission but when small, specialized units, such as SEALS, Special 
Operations Forces (SOF), or reconnaissance forces find themselves in the deep 
battlespace, operating in a low intensity conflict (LIC) environment, these simple 
doctrinal distinctions can sometimes lead to confusion, or worse, friendly fire 
fatalities on the battlefield.  It could be argued that there is a disconnect between 
joint doctrine and joint training which creates an environment on the LIC 
battlefield, as well as in training, that can lead to faulty execution of CAS 
missions, and potentially disastrous results, jeopardizing the safety of the very 
same ground personnel we are trying to support.  
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES 81 
 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  Joint Close Air Support, Close Air Support, 
Fratricide, Fire Support, Low Intensity Conflict 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
JOINT CLOSE AIR SUPPORT IN THE LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT 
 
Michael W. Binney 
Major, United States Marine Corps 
B.A., Boston College, 1986 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 











Author:  Michael W. Binney 
 
 








James J. Wirtz 




























During the Gulf War, millions of people around the 
globe, courtesy of CNN, witnessed the seemingly massive use 
of precision-guided weapons against Iraqi targets in the 
largest air campaign since World War II. Most of the 
missions were flown against Iraqi targets with no friendly 
forces on the ground. This type of air campaign is known as 
Deep Air Support, or ‘DAS’. Equally as important, but 
receiving less spectacular news coverage, is Close Air 
support, or ‘CAS’. When conducting CAS missions, the chance 
for ‘Friendly Fire’ incidents, injuring or killing your own 
troops on the ground, increases dramatically as compared to 
DAS missions. This may seem to be an obvious deduction 
since there are no friendly troops on the ground during a 
DAS mission but when small, specialized units, such as 
SEALS, Special Operations Forces (SOF), or reconnaissance 
forces find themselves in the deep battlespace, operating 
in a low intensity conflict (LIC) environment, these simple 
doctrinal distinctions can sometimes lead to confusion, or 
worse, friendly fire fatalities on the battlefield.  It 
could be argued that there is a disconnect between joint 
doctrine and joint training which creates an environment on 
the LIC battlefield, as well as in training, that can lead 
to faulty execution of CAS missions, and potentially 
disastrous results. Though we have reached a technological 
level that gives us great advantage on the battlefield, the 
doctrine with which we use to prosecute our military 
campaigns, in terms of close air support, has sometimes 
lagged behind our technological advances to such a degree 
that we have jeopardized the safety of the very same ground 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Close Air Support is an air action by fixed and 
rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets 
which are in close proximity to friendly forces 
and which require detailed integration of each 
air mission with the fire and movement of those 
forces. 




During the Gulf War, millions of people around the 
globe, courtesy of CNN, witnessed the seemingly massive use 
of precision-guided weapons against Iraqi targets in the 
largest air campaign since World War II.1 Most of the 
missions were flown against Iraqi targets with no friendly 
forces on the ground. This type of air campaign is known as 
Deep Air Support, or ‘DAS’.2 Equally as important, but 
receiving less spectacular news coverage, is Close Air 
support, or ‘CAS’. CAS missions are typically flown in 
support of ground forces that are engaged with the enemy. 
What delineates CAS from DAS is two doctrinally simple 
guidelines: (1) close proximity to friendly ground forces 
and (2) detailed integration.3 When conducting CAS missions, 
the chance for ‘Friendly Fire’ incidents, injuring or 
killing your own troops on the ground, increases 
dramatically as compared to DAS missions. This may seem to 
be an obvious deduction since there are no friendly troops 
                     
1
 Ricks, Thomas E. “Bull’s-eye War: Pinpointing Bombing Shifts Role 





 JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air 
Support (CAS), Washington: GPO, 1995, pp I-1 
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on the ground during a DAS mission but when small, 
specialized units, such as SEALS, Special Operations Forces 
(SOF), or reconnaissance forces find themselves in the deep 
battlespace, operating in a low intensity conflict (LIC) 
environment, these simple doctrinal distinctions can 
sometimes lead to confusion, or worse, friendly fire 
fatalities on the battlefield.  It could be argued that 
there is a disconnect between joint doctrine and joint 
training which creates an environment on the LIC 
battlefield, as well as in training, that can lead to 
faulty execution of CAS missions, and potentially 
disastrous results. 
B. BACKGROUND 
Close Air Support has been around since the first 
dive-bombing aircraft took to the skies in WWI. Subsequent 
operations in Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua 
further developed the air-to-ground techniques that would 
be used throughout armed conflict in the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries.  The importance of air support to 
ground troops became self-evident as air-to-ground 
techniques were further refined and improved during WWII, 
Korea and Vietnam, and with the advent of sophisticated 
onboard technology such as Inertial Navigation Systems, 
Global Positioning Systems, and laser technology, the 
ability of pilots to deliver highly lethal and accurate 
payloads onto enemy targets has reached staggering 
proportions. Though we have reached a technological level 
that gives us great advantage on the battlefield, the 
doctrine with which we use to prosecute our military 
campaigns, in terms of close air support, has sometimes 
lagged behind our technological advances to such a degree 
3 
that we have jeopardized the safety of the very same ground 
personnel we are trying to support.  
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENT 
The primary questions addressed in this thesis are: 
• Is there a paradigm shift in the importance of 
the close air support mission when conducted in 
the context of the low intensity conflict? If so, 
to what extent, if at all, should our doctrine 
change to accommodate this shift?  
• How do the different services train their aircrew 
and ground controllers in the execution of the 
close air support mission? Is there a significant 
difference in training that could lead to 
conflict on the battlefield when operating as 
part of a joint or coalition force?  
• Do recent case studies of fratricide on the 
battlefield lead to any generalized conclusions 
about the way we train for the close air support 
mission and what, if any, changes could be made 
to current service training to make us a more 
effective joint force on the battlefield?  
• In terms of military transformation, what 
innovations could be used to facilitate a 
transition to a more effective joint force 
structure in regard to the close air support 
mission?   
Conventional wisdom regarding the use of close air 
support Afghanistan was that although the pilots in the air 
and the troops on the ground accomplished the mission at 
hand, there were many items of concern that were brought to 
the attention of each service during “After-Action” 
conferences and from submitted “lessons-learned”. These 
concerns ranged from items such as a lack of doctrinal 
adherence on the part of pilots and ground controllers 
alike to a ‘Vietnam-like’ control of the target sets where 
permission to drop on a target was granted only from the 
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Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in Riyadh. This 
thesis will not attempt to lay blame to any one service but 
will try to examine how doctrine was or was not followed; 
why doctrine was or was not followed; and to assess each 
services training program with regard to close air support. 
The thesis will then try and draw conclusions as to how we 
can train better as a joint force.    
D. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will answer the primary research questions 
by focusing on case studies drawn from recent conflicts in 
Afghanistan, Somalia, the Former Yugoslav Republics, and 
other regional low intensity or unconventional conflicts 
such as the War on Terrorism. In addition, a careful 
analysis of service specific training in the area of close 
air support will be examined to support or reject the 
premise that conventional doctrine does not translate well 
in the low intensity environment.   
E. CHAPTER OUTLINES 
Chapter II of this thesis will examine the strategic 
implications of close air support in the low intensity 
conflict. Drawing from case studies in Somalia, Afghanistan 
and other battlefield examples where close air support has 
had a significant impact far outweighing the battle damage 
of the specific close air support mission parameters, this 
chapter will attempt to show that a paradigm shift has 
occurred in the use of close air support in the low 
intensity conflict. Finally, this chapter will attempt to 
determine what, if any, changes need to be made to our 
doctrinal approach to close air support when executed under 
the context of a low intensity conflict. Ultimately, the 
chapter will argue that close air support, when executed 
under the umbrella of unconventional warfare such as 
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Operation Enduring Freedom or Operation Just Cause, has a 
markedly different impact on the battlefield than when 
conducted on the conventional battlefield and as such, 
military planners need to accept this significant dichotomy 
of the close air support mission.  
Chapter III will focus on case studies of recent 
instances of fratricide. Also drawn from Somalia, 
Afghanistan and other low intensity conflicts, these case 
studies may help us to understand how and why fratricide 
still occurs on the battlefield and whether or not some of 
them may have been avoidable. Service specific training 
will be examined in these cases to determine whether or not 
any deficiencies in training may have caused these tragic 
and unfortunate deaths on the battlefield and in training. 
This chapter will argue that the current training program 
that each service conducts for its close air support 
mission may be adequate for that service when operating as 
a stand alone force but when operating as a joint force, 
the different tactics, techniques, and procedures that each 
service trains their forces in, may be insufficient on the 
joint battlefield.  
Chapter IV will examine doctrine and training from all 
services in the close air support mission. The USAF and 
USMC training for ground forward air controllers will be 
covered in detail as well as the aircrew training for the 
USAF, USN and USMC tactical platforms that perform the 
close air support mission. In addition to these two 
training programs, the chapter will cover the training that 
aircrews receive in the forward air controller (airborne) 
or FAC(A) mission. The chapter will attempt to derive any 
specific differences and deficiencies among the service 
6 
specific training programs that might lead to doctrinal 
confusion or execution problems for the joint operating 
forces. The chapter will also try to draw related 
conclusions between the problems of battlefield fratricide 
and service specific training and what, if any, changes 
could be made to limit this loss of life on the battlefield 
and in training.  
Finally, Chapter V will summarize the thesis and argue 
that a concerted effort will be necessary by all services 
to tackle the problems that exist with current doctrine and 
training in the close air support mission. In doing so, the 
joint operating forces will better be able to execute the 
close air support mission in training and on the joint 
battlefield.   
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II. STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF JOINT CLOSE AIR 
SUPPORT 
The truth is, this will be a war like none other 
our nation has faced. 




Since the very first manned aerial flight, there have 
been those individuals who have proffered the use of 
airpower to bring a tactical advantage to ground forces on 
the battlefield. In the first war utilizing fixed wing 
aircraft, pilots on both sides used small biplanes to drop 
rudimentary bombs on the trenches of opposing forces in the 
‘Great War’. This had a demoralizing effect on the troops 
but did not do much actual damage when compared to the 
mayhem caused by both allied and axis artillery support. As 
the war progressed, the pilots became more involved, and 
arguably more enamored, with ‘dog fighting’ their opposing 
pilots in aerial duels trying to shoot one another down. 
Because of the lack of carrying capacity of those early 
aircraft, more attention was paid to the importance of 
clearing the skies of enemy aircraft than was paid to 
dropping ordnance on opposing forces and helping to shape 
the ground battle.  
With the fall of the Soviet Union and the demise of a 
real and credible air-to-air threat, the US military has 
been turning its attention over the past decade towards the 
impact of tactical aircraft on ground warfare. That is not 
to say that there has not been a concerted effort in the 
development of CAS; conversely, the mission of aerial 
8 
support of ground forces with close air support has been 
demonstrated and refined during WWII, Korea, Vietnam and 
every major conflict the US has been involved with since 
WWI. Suffice it to say that the techniques and tactics 
utilized in the close air support mission had always taken 
a back seat to the larger and more glamorous mission of 
air-to-air engagement of enemy aircraft and the ‘deep 
strike’ strategic missions.4 WWII combat correspondents used 
to spin tales of the aerial combat exploits of allied 
fighter pilots and how they achieved their five (5) air-to-
air kills and received the label of ‘Ace’, regardless of 
how many tons of ordnance that they may have dropped on 
enemy positions, especially those dropped in support of 
allied ground forces.  The purpose of this chapter is not 
to discuss which is more important: the downing of enemy 
aircraft or the delivery of ordnance payloads in support of 
engaged ground forces. Rather, it is to examine and clarify 
the strategic implications of close air support in the Low 
Intensity Conflict (LIC), and secondly, to try and 
understand under what conditions that change a tactical 
mission’s results into strategic ones. This will be 
accomplished by examining several case studies that involve 
both tactical battlefield successes as well as failures.   
With the emergence and proliferation of precision-
guided munitions on the battlefield, the accuracy of 
ordnance-to-target has never been greater. Conversely, with 
the same technology, the potential magnitude of mistakes 
made in the execution of close air support on the 




dor2a.ht (April 2003) 
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battlefield, both by ground controllers and tactical 
aircraft, has also never been greater.  
It can be argued that the U.S Military, specifically 
those individuals trained to conduct CAS missions, both on 
the ground and in the air, have entered into a new realm of 
warfare in which the success or failure of a relatively 
small tactical mission can have an exponentially greater 
strategic affect.  
The conditions for this new era of CAS have evolved 
from the proliferation of the LIC environment, especially 
the War on Terrorism, as well as several other factors to 
include (1) globalization of multimedia, (2) the 
disintegration of centralized governments, and (3) 
technological advances in the lethality and accuracy of 
air-to-ground weaponry and support equipment. 
Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-23.1 
defines Close Air Support as an air action by fixed or 
rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in 
close proximity to friendly forces on the ground and which 
requires detailed integration.5 In the past, this has been a 
fairly easy concept to understand. However, with the 
increasing regularity of the Low Intensity Conflict or 
unconventional warfare it has changed the outlook and 
conceptual application of CAS from a tactical mission 
(which supports the ground commander’s maneuver objectives) 
to one that has far-reaching strategic implications, both 
positive and negative. 
In November of 2001, a U.S. Special Forces Forward Air 
Controller working alongside Pashtun tribesmen, utilizing 
                     
5
 Close Air Support, MCWP 3-23.1, US Marine Corps, July 1998, pp 1-1 
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only a radio and the rapid response of U.S. Airpower, 
coordinated an aerial attack on Taliban forces that wer 
counter-attacking his position. The end result of the 
mission was the destruction of the Taliban column, and more 
importantly the solidification of the relationship between 
U.S. Special Forces and their Afghan Allies. This incident, 
as well as the proceeding case studies, will attempt to 
explain how a single tactical mission can have far-reaching 
results well above the success of a single tactical 
mission.6 
  
B. HISTORICAL CASE STUDIES 
1. Task Force Ranger 
In October of 1993, the US Army had a contingent of 
Rangers and Delta Force working alongside the UN Mission in 
Somalia, but unlike their UN counterparts, Task Force 
Ranger had a very different mission than that of the 
peacekeepers. Their mission was to hunt down and arrest 
Mohamed Farrah Aidid, the local warlord from the Habageeter 
tribe that was controlling the flow of food to the starving 
Somalis. What he was doing, in fact, was using the food 
supplied by the UN mission to Somalia as blackmail against 
the other rival tribes. Because of his actions towards the 
other tribes, who were not getting the food they needed to 
survive, thousands of innocent Somali men, women and 
children were dying needlessly. In addition, it was Aidid’s 
tribe that was causing the most trouble for the UN 
Peacekeepers, and after a series of particularly heinous 
actions against UN Peacekeepers, President Clinton ordered 
                     
6
 http://www.global-defence.com/comms-o.view.html (April 2003) 
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Task Force Ranger to standup and be prepared to deploy to 
the region. 
In the fall of 1993, TF Ranger deployed to Somalia. 
After they arrived in country, they began to conduct 
‘snatch’ missions, missions where they would vertically 
deploy via helicopters from the Mogadishu International 
Airport, (their current base of operations), utilizing the 
MH-60 Blackhawk and the AH-6J Loach from Task Force 160th  
(TF160) for helicopter and close air support. A typical 
mission would be to vertically envelopment a suspected 
enemy compound, seize the key personnel from the location, 
and transport them back to their base for further 
processing.  
One such mission, which was the impetus for the movie 
Blackhawk Down, began on the morning of 3 Oct 1993. TF 
Ranger had received intelligence from a Somali source 
working as a paid CIA informer. The intelligence 
information, which later turned out to be suspect, was that 
several of Aidid’s key lieutenants were holed up in a 
building next to the Olympic Hotel near the busy Bakara 
Market, a place that was almost totally under the control 
of men loyal to Aidid. What the mission commanders did not 
know was that they would be waiting for them to arrive. 
In previous missions, these men had tried to shoot 
down US helicopters utilizing Rocket Propelled Grenades, or 
RPGs. Though they had successfully shot down one helicopter 
in the past, the tactics of this mission was to use 
hundreds of RPGs instead of the sparing amount used in 
previous missions against U.S. helicopters. This was 
something that TFR had not anticipated as was evidenced by 
the type of tactics utilized by TF 160th helicopters, flying 
12 
low-level over the city during daylight hours, something 
they should only have done during the night or at an 
altitude that was outside the maximum effective range of an 
RPG.  
In addition to this oversight of improper tactics by 
TF 160th support aircraft, TF Ranger also requested and was 
subsequently denied the use of AC-130 Specter gunship 
support. Part of the reason that TF 160th was utilizing 
daylight tactics was that the AH-6J gunship support would 
be more responsive to close air support requests, something 
that would have been unnecessary had TF Ranger been granted 
approval to use the AC-130 gunship. 
The AC-130 Specter gunship carries a variety of air-
to-ground weaponry ranging from 20mm to 105mm, but the most 
impressive and accurate system on-board the aircraft is the 
105mm howitzer. Located in the tail of the aircraft, this 
howitzer can level a building in only a few shots. It has a 
targeting system that utilizes some of the most 
sophisticated sensors that the US military employs on the 
battlefield today, and was the type of close air support 
one would want in an urban environment, especially 
Mogadishu. The only drawback, if one could call it a 
drawback, was the possibility of collateral damage, 
especially to unarmed civilians. Such was the reasoning of 
Les Aspin, then Secretary of Defense, when asked why he 
declined the request for AC-130 gunship support during the 
mission. 
Although the AH-6J Littlebird (or Loach as it is 
sometimes called), is a very versatile and efficient 
platform in the close air support role, it does not have 
the accuracy and firepower of the AC-130, and is limited in 
13 
the type and quantities of ordnance it can carry. The 
amount per sortie is limited to fourteen 2.75” High 
Explosive (HE) rockets and several thousand rounds of 
7.62mm, which can be fired from dual mounted mini-guns. 
This is fairly consequential since the AC-130 can carry 
literally thousands of rounds of small arms ammunition as 
well as hundreds of HE rounds of 105mm. In addition, the 
loiter time of the AC-130 is extensive and could have 
covered extended periods of the mission.7 
There can be no denying the absolute professionalism 
of the TF 160th aircrews during this battle. Many more 
Rangers and Delta Force personnel would surely have lost 
their lives were it not for the incredible tenacity that 
was displayed by the AH-6J pilots throughout the battle in 
delivering precise, timely and responsive air-to-ground 
fire support; however, it can also be said that they were 
flying to the maximum extent of their capabilities. As each 
Littlebird expended its ordnance load, it quickly made the 
flight back to Mogadishu International Airport, refueled, 
rearmed and ingressed back to the objective area. Due to 
the lack of a sophisticated surface-to-air threat, had an 
AC-130 detachment been deployed in theatre, it could have 
patrolled the skies over Mogadishu with impunity and 
delivered lethal close air support that could have enabled 
TF Ranger to accomplish its mission.8 This could have been 
accomplished even with Aidid’s militia being ready for 
them, something that had been suspected from the beginning 
of the operation. Because the response time of Aidid’s 
militia was so rapid, military analysts speculated that 
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Aidid and his militia knew the Americans were coming and 
were itching for a fight.9  
Another significant aspect of the mission to consider 
is the fact that had the AC-130 been utilized, the two MH-
60 Blackhawks that were shot down, callsigns “Super 61” and 
“Super 64”, would not have been hovering over the city but 
would have been holding out over the water, awaiting the 
extraction call. Since there was no AC-130 support, it was 
deemed essential that the MH-60’s, as well as the AH-6’s, 
were needed in the close air support role, even if their 
only form of suppression came from the crew-served machine 
guns. 
In the aftermath of TF Ranger’s mission, President 
Clinton ordered the pullout of the Rangers and Delta Force. 
It is generally agreed that the loss of 19 American lives, 
as well as the graphic scenes of dead US Soldiers being 
dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, had a significant 
impact on the President’s decision to pull out of Somalia.  
Many lessons were learned from this mission but one of 
the most profound was the critical advantage that US forces 
gain from having effective, accurate and timely close air 
support. Although considered a tactical mission, the lack 
of substantial close air support in Somalia had far 
reaching consequences beyond the tactical and operational 
level. The critical decision to deny AC-130 support to TF 
Ranger had strategic implications that the National Command 
Authority (i.e. the Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin) failed 
to recognize.10 
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2. UAV Predator Mission   
On Sunday, Nov 3rd, 2002, the CIA successfully carried 
out the first recorded unmanned attack on six al-Qaeda 
operatives in northern Yemen. What makes this operation 
unique is that a Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) was 
used as the delivery platform. Even more significant is 
that the weapon used for the mission was a Hellfire laser 
guided weapon. The Hellfire missile is an anti-tank, laser-
guided weapon that tracks on reflected laser energy either 
from an independent ground source or an airborne laser 
designator. The laser source is modulated to distinguish 
itself from any other stray laser source that may exist on 
the battlefield. The Hellfire missile can then be 
programmed with the same modulation and when it senses the 
same laser reflection as the missile seeker head is looking 
for, it ‘locks’ onto the target and the flight controls 
steer the missile to the target. In Feb of 2001, the US Air 
Force successfully tested and launched precision guided 
missiles from a UAV. The CIA quickly incorporated the 
technology and in Nov of 2002, put the technology to use. 
Killed in the aforementioned attack was Qaed Salim 
Sinan al-Harethi and five other low-level al-Qaeda members. 
US officials have been quick to praise the attack on the 
terrorists as one of the ‘best’ kills in Washington’s war 
on terrorism.11 One item that is missing from the article in 
the Washington Times is the matter of who or what was 
designating the target at the time of the mission. This 
missing piece of information is quite important as it 
further indicates the strategic impact of a successful 
close air support mission. 
                     
11
 The Washington Times, 5 Nov. 2002, “U.S. kills al Qaeda terrorist 
who attacked Cole”, Scarborough, Rowan. 
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There are several questions from this mission that are 
worth exploring further. First, who was on the ground to 
confirm or deny the location of al-Harethi and his 
henchmen? Secondly, how was this information processed in 
such a timely matter to gain approval to hit the target? 
It could be postulated, without going into classified 
mission details, that there was a ‘spotter’ on the ground 
in close proximity to the target. Since al-Harethi was in a 
moving vehicle, there seems to be no way of knowing, based 
strictly on UAV or satellite imagery, whether or not the 
six men in the car were in fact who we believed them to be. 
The simple fact of the matter is that there had to be 
someone on the ground who could identify the target as 
hostile, locate the target and provide up to the second 
targeting information to the individuals responsible for 
the operation of the UAV. Since it was a CIA operation, it 
is most likely that we will never know the exact details of 
the operation but suffice it to say that there was at least 
one individual, probably more, that had a laser designator 
and the proper communications gear to conduct the mission 
from the ground.  
Once al-Harethi’s identity was confirmed and the 
approval for the mission was given from the CAOC (Combined 
Air Operations Center, located in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia), 
the mission probably went something like this: First, radio 
contact between the ground observer(s) and the UAV ‘pilots’ 
was established, the mission brief was given, laser codes 
confirmed and targeting data was sent to enable the UAV to 
acquire the target. If the ground observer was handling the 
laser designator, proper geometry was established to 
prevent the Hellfire missile from tracking on the 
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designator and not the target. Once the Predator drone’s 
missile acquired the target and the ordnance was released, 
the confirmation of the target being destroyed could be 
independently confirmed by both the UAV’s imagery and the 
ground observer. In addition to these vital pieces of 
information, approval from higher headquarters would have 
to have been received before the mission proceeded to the 
terminal phase, that of the missile being released from the 
Predator Drone and the automobile’s destruction. The end 
result was the successful destruction of the terrorist who 
was believed to have plotted the 1998 bombing of the U.S.S. 
Cole. 
 
C. CONCLUSION  
The above mentioned mission parameters fall into the 
definition of close air support because of two very simple 
concepts, (1) close proximity to friendly forces on the 
ground (CIA operators), and (2) detailed integration (laser 
designator, mission brief, target information, and battle 
damage assessment). The outcome of the mission was much 
more than just a tactical success or the ‘destruction of a 
target’; it was far more consequential than that. The U.S. 
had gained a strategic victory in the War on Terrorism. As 
one can see, and as this writer is convinced, close air 
support in the Low Intensity Conflict, or unconventional 
warfare, has far greater strategic significance than when 
close air support is employed in a conventional conflict. 
There are some suggestions that close air support in 
the LIC environment should be re-classified so as not to 
confuse the normal relationship between CAS and DAS in the 
conventional conflict. That is to say, let us call CAS 
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something else when it is flown in support of such 
unconventional missions as a CIA operation or Operation 
Enduring Freedom. I am not here to argue that point but to 
simply point out the significant difference that CAS has 
when accomplished successfully or unsuccessfully during 
unconventional warfare. It is a paradigm shift from our 
normal understanding of CAS missions flown during a 
‘theatre conflict’ such as Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.  
As the U.S. appears to be wrapping up combat 
operations in Iraq, it will be interesting to see how the 
after action reports and lessons learned from the CAS 
missions play out and whether or not they had a strategic 
impact like they had in past low intensity conflicts such 
as Somalia and Afghanistan. My belief is that they will not 
have the same impact and although an essential element to 
any US ground combat operation, CAS in the conventional 
realm does not have the strategic impact it does in the LIC 
or unconventional environment. I feel this will continue to 
reside squarely only in the tactical realm in support of 
the ground combat element commander’s operational 
objectives.  
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III. JOINT CLOSE AIR SUPPORT FRATRICIDE 
A. OVERVIEW 
One of the greatest strengths of our U.S. Military is 
its ability to use combined arms on the battlefield to 
effectively and decisively defeat its enemies. By utilizing 
technological advances for acquisition, targeting and 
destruction, we can overcome a numerically superior force 
by using deadly accurate fire support systems such as 
artillery, naval gunfire, mortars, and close air support. 
On the flip side, one of the most tragic occurrences 
on the battlefield is when we kill our own troops due to 
‘friendly fire’ or fratricide. There is nothing friendly 
about ‘friendly fire’ and it must be noted that with the 
substantial decrease in the amount of casualties that we 
have seen in recent conflicts such as the Gulf War, 
Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the killing of our 
own troops on the battlefield due to friendly fire has 
increased media attention exponentially. It must also be 
noted that since the Gulf War in 1991, the increase in 
technological advances of our weapon systems makes them 
more lethal, however, if targeted incorrectly, they are 
that much more lethal to our own troops on the battlefield. 
During this chapter, several case studies of 
fratricide will be examined to determine if there are any 
causal factors or trends that can explain why we continue 
to kill our own on the battlefield. It may be that there 
are no hard and fast answers that can be quantified and 
used to eliminate or significantly decrease fratricide on 
the battlefield or it may be that there are significant 
20 
trends, actions, or attitudes that lead to fratricide that 
can be addressed to help lessen those losses.  
Case studies will include after action reports from 
Afghanistan and Operation Enduring Freedom as well as 
incidences of fratricide that have occurred during training 
that emulate joint operations in the low intensity 
conflict. It must be noted that only air-to-ground cases of 
fratricide will be examined, and more specifically, only 
cases where a ‘small footprint’ of ground troops are 
present. This is done to narrow the scope of this chapter 
to fratricide in the low intensity conflict and how 
misapplication of procedures and understanding of doctrine 
can and does lead to, what this author believes, avoidable 
deaths on the battlefield. 
    
B. BACKGROUND 
As stated previously, a CAS mission is flown in 
support of ground forces that are engaged with the enemy 
and requires (1) close proximity to friendly ground forces 
and (2) detailed integration. CAS missions increase the 
chances for ‘Friendly Fire’ incidents because the ordnance 
dropped is usually dropped within line of sight of friendly 
troops on the ground. Since the chances for injuring or 
killing your own troops on the ground increases 
dramatically during a CAS mission, it is essential that all 
players in the CAS mission profile, ground controllers, 
tactical aircrew, and all support entities, understand and 
apply doctrinal procedures that have been written in the 
blood of servicemen since WWI.  
During the past 12 years, since the end of the first 
Gulf War, the U.S. Armed Forces have been engaged in 
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multiple conflicts that have tended towards the low 
intensity conflict. Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and 
Afghanistan are examples of this and emphasize the 
devolution of the type of conflict we expected to fight 
with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The War on 
Terrorism has increased this tendency towards low intensity 
operations and underscores the need for us to address the 
close air support mission in a different context, that of a 
joint force multiplier and not as a parochial mission task 
of a specific service.  
The misunderstanding or misapplication of joint 
doctrine will be the context by which this chapter examines 
the following fratricide case studies. This will be done in 
order to hopefully glean some insight into how we train and 
apply close air support concepts in joint, low intensity 
operations. 
   
C. CASE STUDIES 
1. Udari Range Incident 12 March 2001 
On March 12th, 2001, a Navy F/A-18 from the USS Harry 
S. Truman inadvertently dropped a Mk-82 500 lb. General 
Purpose (GP) bomb on a friendly observation post on the 
Udari Range, 45 miles northwest of Kuwait City.12 
The events and details surrounding the incident offer 
several opportunities to examine joint tactics, techniques 
and procedures of close air support doctrine. 
The pilot of the F/A-18, and squadron commander of 
VFA-37, which was embarked aboard the USS Truman at the 
time of the incident, was involved in a CASEX or close air 
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support exercise at the Udari Range. Terminal control of 
the CAS assets during the exercise was an Air Force ETAC 
who was qualified as a terminal controller and had been 
conducting day close air support training prior to the 
incident.  
In addition to the F/A-18 and ETAC, Air Force Staff 
Sergeant Timothy Crusing, there was a Navy F-14 that was 
providing assistance in the form of FAC(A) guidance during 
the bombing runs. 
Typically a FAC(A) would be given control of a CAS 
mission if the ground FAC could not see the target and 
needed and requested help from an airborne FAC, in this 
case the F-14.13 What is interesting to note about this case 
is that the ground controller could easily see the targets 
he intended to hit with the F/A-18, but allowed the F-14 to 
‘ride’ along the tail of the F/A-18 as an extra set of 
eyes. This is not doctrinal to the CAS mission and is a 
substantial element to the confusion that lead to the 
inadvertent drop of the bomb on the wrong target.  
Inherent in any FAC or FAC(A)’s duties during a 
mission is the release authority to drop ordnance on a 
target. This authority to drop is granted only to the FAC 
or FAC(A) controlling the mission, in this case the ground 
FAC.  
Prior to this mishap bombing run, the ground 
controller and F/A-18 had been conducting CAS runs during 
the daytime with no unusual incidents. Subsequent to the 
daytime missions, the F-14 had checked on station with the 
ground FAC and requested practice in controlling CAS 
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Support (CAS), Washington: GPO, 1995 
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aircraft. The ground FAC granted permission to the F-14 to 
follow in trace of the F/A-18 and provide target guidance 
but the ground FAC never passed control of the mission or 
clearance to release ordnance to the F-14. What the F-14 
did was to pass ‘nose’ corrections to the F/A-18 (for 
example, ‘target easy left’, ‘target easy right’, or ‘nose 
pointed at the target’). During the fatal bombing run in 
which five U.S. servicemen and one New Zealand Special 
Forces Officer was killed, the Navy F-14 FAC(A) gave the 
mishap aircraft the same verbal guidance of ‘nose pointed 
at target’, even though the F/A-18 was pointed at 
Observation Post 10 on the Udari Range which included 
upwards of 20 coalition military personnel.  
It is quite possible that the voice reports given by 
the F-14 and acknowledged by the F/A-18 pilot contributed 
materially to the mishap, even though, as a matter of 
doctrine, the ground FAC was responsible for and gave the 
final clearance for ordnance drop. 
At the same time that the F/A-18 pilot was receiving 
the F-14 voice reports over the TAD net, the Air Force 
ground FAC was listening to them as well. During the 
daylight hours, he was able to double-check these voice 
reports visually and since the F-14 had not given any 
unusual or unsafe reports prior to dusk, he was lulled into 
a false sense of security when the F-14 gave the same voice 
report to the F/A-18, even though his nose was pointed at 
the OP and not the target area. As stated before, the 
ground FAC gave the clearance to drop but had the F-14 not 
been giving voice reports during prior bombing runs, he 
would have had to visually check the F/A-18 each and every 
run to ensure that he was pointing at the target area, 
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something which he did not do on the mishap bombing run 
until after he gave the ‘cleared hot’; he visually checked 
one second too late. Upon realizing his mistake, the ground 
FAC, to his credit, tried to abort the mission but the F/A-
18 pilot had already hit his ‘pickle’ button and released 
three five hundred pound bombs.  
By reviewing this incident, it is not the scope of 
this paper to try and lay blame to any other than who the 
investigating authorities did, the ground FAC. Rather, it 
is the scope of this paper to determine what doctrinal 
concepts were or were not adhered to. 
Foremost on this list is the use of the F-14 as a 
second set of eyes for the F/A-18 and ground FAC. Inherent 
in each CAS mission is the relationship between controller 
and CAS aircraft. The two must coordinate together to put 
bombs on target effectively and efficiently, and within the 
scope of the mission, as safely as possible. I state this 
up front to underscore the idea that sometimes a controller 
will need to put ordnance closer to his position based on 
the enemy threat. It is strictly a controller’s prerogative 
to drop in close proximity of his position than is 
acceptable during peacetime operations. This is known as 
‘danger close’. 
Arguably the inclusion of the F-14 FAC(A) into the 
mission, although it may have been beneficial to the F-14 
aircrew training, was not in accordance with doctrine and 
contributed to a false sense of security to the other 
players in this mishap. 
First, a FAC(A), by definition, is only required when 
the FAC on the ground cannot see the target area and needs 
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the added benefit of the FAC(A)’s eyes to direct the CAS 
asset onto the target. Secondly, the clearance authority to 
drop ordnance was never passed to the F-14 aircrew. This is 
something which should have been done if the F-14 aircrew 
was trying to train to joint standards. If not, both the 
ground controller and the FAC(A) aircraft were adding 
another piece to the CAS puzzle that was non-doctrinal.14 
Why then did the ground FAC allow the F-14 to 
participate in the mission from a non-doctrinal 
perspective? Why did the F-14 not request terminal control 
of the F/A-18? At the heart of this mishap lies the 
question of training. What kind of training did each player 
receive? The mishap investigation, conducted by Lt Gen 
Michael P. DeLong, Deputy CentCom Commander, concluded that 
each player was properly designated by their respective 
units, but did little to answer the question of what type 
of training did each participant receive. This, I believe, 
is the crux of this issue. 
The Air Force ETAC received the appropriate training 
from the JFCC course at AGOS, Nellis Air Force Base. The 
Nay F/A-18 pilot was properly designated to conduct CAS 
training in support of ground troops and the F-14 aircrew 
was properly designated as having completed the FAC(A) 
syllabus for their squadron. The main point to pull from 
this incident is that three separate entities, trained at 
three separate sites, and in accordance with three separate 
training syllabuses, came together to execute CAS training 
in a joint environment. Should not the training that these 
participants receive at least be developed jointly to 
ensure that all players are on the same sheet of music? It 




can be argued that parochial training programs are at the 
heart of misapplication of joint doctrine and unless the 
services can agree on a joint training program for ground 
controllers, airborne controllers, and close air support 
aircraft, incidents like this will continue to occur. 
  
2. B-52 JDAM Incident 05 December 2001 
On 5 Dec. 2001, a U.S. Air Force B-52 dropped a GPS-
guided Joint Direct Attack Munitions, or JDAM, on a 
friendly position near Sayd Alim Kalay, Afghanistan, 
killing three U.S. Service members and five Afghan 
soldiers, as well as injuring numerous US and Afghan 
soldiers.15  
Central to this fratricide incident was the use of a 
hand-held GPS receiver. Investigators of the incident 
determined that the ground forward air controller was using 
a hand-held GPS receiver to send enemy coordinates to the 
B-52 so that the aircrew could then program their payloads, 
(in this case the JDAM bomb), to hit the precise 
coordinates given to them by the ground controller. In this 
case, the procedures were correct except that the 
coordinates given to the B-52 were not the enemy’s 
position, but rather the friendly position of the U.S. and 
Afghan fighters.16  
The investigation also discovered that the GPS 
receiver’s batteries had been replaced just prior to the 
passing of the coordinates. What is of significance to this 
sequence of events is that when the batteries on this 




ies/ (April 2003) 
16
 http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/killing.cfm (April 2003) 
27 
specific GPS receiver are replaced, the GPS, upon powering 
up, displays its current location. The ground controller 
had mistakenly thought that the GPS receiver would display 
the last known coordinates prior to being shut down for 
battery replacement, which was the coordinates of the enemy 
position. 
In addition to the replacement of the batteries, 
another item of doctrinal interest occurred that 
contributed to this mishap: the sending of friendly 
coordinates in the proper format. Typically, and in 
accordance with JCAS doctrine, an enemy position is sent as 
a 10-digit coordinate and a friendly position is sent as a 
6-digit coordinate. This is done for several reasons. 
First, an enemy position is sent as a 10-digit coordinate 
if a GPS is used to improve the accuracy of the weapon 
system. Conversely, the coordinates of a friendly position 
is passed as a 6-digit coordinate to decrease the accuracy 
of any enemy weapon system that might be employed against 
them if the enemy has signal interception capability. In 
this case, if the Taliban somehow had the ability to 
intercept U.S. transmissions, the friendly position sent 
via the radio would only give the Taliban the ability to 
target friendly positions down to the nearest hundreds of 
meters. There might be just enough of a built-in error with 
the 6-digit coordinate to allow U.S or coalition forces to 
escape injury if an attack were executed utilizing the 
intercepted transmissions and friendly coordinates. If the 
friendly position coordinates are transmitted to orbiting 
aircraft in the 10-digit format, with the intent to help 
them identify and not target friendly forces on the ground, 
and the Taliban were able to intercept these coordinates, 
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any attack they might be able to mount utilizing indirect 
fire support would be that much more accurate. 
In this incident, both friendly and enemy coordinates 
were passed utilizing the 10-digit format. This is not to 
say that the mishap would not have occurred, only that an 
additional doctrinal misapplication occurred in concert 
with the wrong coordinates being transmitted to the B-52.  
Why then did this duly qualified forward air 
controller make such simple mistakes? While the accident 
underscores the inherent danger of armed conflict and the 
potential for fratricide on the battlefield, it raises some 
important questions regarding the training our armed forces 
receive in the conduct of close air support. 
As an Air Force ETAC, the controller in question had 
completed the requisite training prescribed by the USAF for 
the conduct of close air support but did the training he 
receive include the use of a GPS receiver and the 
intricacies surrounding its use? The answer is no.17  
This is not an isolated incident in any way, shape or 
form either. None of the services, though exposed to the 
use of GPS receivers, has a curriculum requirement to train 
their ground controllers in the use of a GPS receiver. 
Most, if not all, of this type of training is accomplished 
in the context of on-the-job training (OJT).18 As stated 
earlier in this paper, the training that Air Force, Marine 
and Navy ground controllers receive is generally centered 
around the control of tactical aircraft from check-in to 
actual ordnance release. The method in which a trainee 
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locates the target on the map or with the naked eye does 
not include the use of a GPS receiver. 
One unique ability of the GPS receiver is that it can 
take information derived from a laser designator or range 
finder, process that information and compute a location 
based on slant range from the laser source. In this 
fashion, the location of an enemy position can be 
determined to within just a few meters. 
If you take this ability and compare it to the normal 
way in which a target position is derived, (that of map 
estimation, which is limited in accuracy to hundreds of 
meters vice just a few from the laser/GPS combination), it 
is easy to see the benefits of utilizing this technology.19 
The obvious question here is that if the GPS can 
provide terminal controllers with such highly accurate 
target coordinates, why then is this not the preferred 
method of instruction at the service schools? Again, the 
question of terminal controller proficiency lies in 
training, not on-the-job training, but training at a 
designated school facility where obvious mistakes such as 
the one described in this mishap can be averted by proper 
technical training utilizing sophisticated equipment that 
will be part of the terminal controllers equipment once 
deployed. Simply put, had the training of this Air Force 
ground controller included the use of a GPS receiver, he 
may not have made this type of mistake on the battlefield. 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
There are many factors that can lead to fratricide on 
the battlefield. Terrain, weather, proficiency, loss of 
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situational awareness, discipline, technological 
malfunctions, battlefield stress and the general fog of war 
are just some of the causative factors of fratricide.20 Some 
of these we will never be able to eliminate from actual 
combat operations, but the items that can be addressed 
should be addressed, and one of the most prominent of them 
is training. It is this author’s opinion that our current 
training is too limited in terms of proficiency, and the 
instances of fratricide described above appear to confirm 
this. While it is likely we will never eliminate fratricide 
completely from the battlefield, we can take steps to 
significantly decrease its occurrence. Joint training 
initiatives as described in the proceeding chapter will go 
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IV. JOINT CLOSE AIR SUPPORT TRAINING & DOCTRINE 
Commanders and units must constantly emphasize 
training that routinely exercises CAS tactics, 
techniques, and procedures. Continuous, realistic 
training creates a better understanding of 
battlefield conditions and the situations in 
which CAS may be employed. Successful CAS 
training will result in safe and effective CAS 
employment and provide for synergistic fire 
support during all MAGTF operations. 
Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-23.1, 
Close Air Support 
 
A. OVERVIEW 
The previous chapter dealt with how the close air 
support mission takes on significantly greater strategic 
characteristics when conducted in the low intensity 
conflict. This chapter will examine current close air 
support doctrine and training and attempt to delineate a 
difference between both execution in the conventional realm 
and the unconventional or low intensity conflict. To do 
this, an examination of after action reports and lessons 
learned from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation 
Anaconda (OA) will be utilized.  
The current revision of Joint Vision 2020 (JV 2020) 
addresses several concepts that directly apply to the Joint 
Close Air Support (JCAS) arena. Specifically, JV 2020 
presents the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff‘s (CJCS) 
priorities, which include Doctrine, Organization, Training, 
Leadership, People and Facilities.21 Two of these are a bit 
nebulous - Leadership and People - as the military has 
always concerned itself with these and how to balance the 
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two in regard to mission accomplishment. They also apply to 
an already established desire to put the right people in 
the right job. With that said, this chapter will 
concentrate on the remaining four (4) concepts of 
transformation, Doctrine, Organization, Training, and 
Facilities. 
Before examining the desired end state of 
transformation in the JCAS arena, we first need to 
understand the current status of JCAS doctrine, 
organization, training and facilities. This chapter will 
address each of these separately. 
 
B. DOCTRINE 
The current joint publication that outlines the 
planning and execution of JCAS is Joint Publication (JP) 3-
09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint 
Close Air Support.22  
As the Lead Agent (LA) for JP 3-09.3, the U.S. Marine 
Corps is responsible for revising and publishing JP 3-09.3 
with input from the other services. There is a mandate from 
the JCS that it be updated every five years to incorporate 
innovations, new concepts and new technologies that have 
been realized from the previous five years’ worth of 
training and actual combat operations. 
The last version of JP 3-09.3 was published in 1995 
and has not been re-issued for the last eight years, three 
years past its mandated revision date. There are several 
possible reasons for this, not least of which may be fiscal 
constraints. In addition, it is possible that all parties 
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to the revision have agreed upon the current doctrine with 
little desire to change the status quo.23 
The lack of agreement on following doctrine outlined 
in JP 3-09.3 may suggest or point to an even greater 
parochial system where, in theory, all parties agree to the 
joint tactics, techniques, and procedures as set forth in 
JP 3-09.3, but in reality plan and execute their own TTP’s 
with little regard to the doctrine set forth in 3-09.3. 
Consequently, the different branches of the armed services 
may have no need or desire to re-write a publication that 
is sufficiently vague to facilitate this doctrinal 
departure for service specific goals and agendas.  
This chapter will attempt to show specific examples to 
support this assertion and to offer practical solutions to 
avoid this type of doctrinal conflict in the future.   
In the past two years, the U.S. military has been 
involved in multiple armed conflicts, specifically, 
Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as ongoing operations in 
Bosnia and Kosovo. In all of these areas of operations 
(AO), the use of air power, specifically close air support, 
as a force multiplier and sometimes as the sole platform 
for fire support, has become increasingly significant. As 
the use of tactical aircraft (TacAir) as the primary (and 
sometimes only) fire support platform has increased, (due 
in large part to the geographical inaccessibility of some 
of the conflicts we are involved in, as well as the 
increased reliance on precision guided munitions (PGMs)), 
so has the highlighting of some significant differences 
between the services in the way we train and operate. 
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The area of JCAS has not been immune to this type of 
friction, and in the Afghanistan theatre this friction has 
been especially felt between the services. With a 
relatively small ground combat footprint, the reliance on 
CAS has been significant to give the U.S. military and its 
coalition partners the tactical advantage on the 
battlefield. This reliance has also had the secondary 
effect of highlighting some major problems between the 
joint forces, both on the ground and in the air. These 
differences have been born out of a transition from 
conventional warfare to the low intensity conflict and the 
added problems that a conflict like Afghanistan and 
Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Anaconda can 
produce. 
 
1. Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF)  
Overall combat operations in Afghanistan were executed 
under the umbrella of OEF, with OA being executed under 
OEF. What differentiates OA from OEF is that OEF was 
predominantly a Special Operations Forces (SOF) Mission 
while OA was conducted as more of a joint sub-operation of 
OEF to root out the remaining strongholds of the Taliban 
and al-Qaeda.24  
With the introduction of joint forces into OEF, 
specifically Marine Corps Marine Expeditionary Units 
(Special Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC)) and Carrier Battle 
Groups (CVBG), friction started to develop between air and 
ground forces based on (1) a lack of working knowledge of 
joint doctrine, (2) misunderstanding of joint doctrine, and 
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(3) deviation from joint doctrine for little to no reason 
other than taking the ‘path of least resistance’.25 
Some of the reasons given for this departure from 
joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP’s) was that 
OEF and OA were not conventional-type operations and 
therefore conventional TTP’s were not applicable to the 
situation. While this may sound reasonable on the surface, 
it quickly became apparent that unless all forces involved 
in OEF and AO agreed upon the doctrinal deviations, no 
common baseline for conducting air-to-ground missions could 
be established. 
The measure of operational effectiveness, or in this 
case, joint operational effectiveness, can be measured at 
all levels of warfare: strategic, operational, and 
tactical. However, in the arena of JCAS, effectiveness can 
and should be measured at the tactical level, specifically, 
how well joint forces accomplish the air-to-ground close 
air support mission. 
a. OEF & OA After Action Reports 
During the post-OA JCAS conference held at Al-
Jaber Air Base in Kuwait and based on after action (AA) 
reports and lessons learned (LL) from OEF & OA, it is 
apparent that the joint operating forces did not execute 
the close air support mission as effectively as it could 
have, and in some cases, executed the mission poorly, 
sometimes with disastrous results.26 That is not to say that 
the mission was not accomplished, but that the mission 
could have been executed with significantly greater results 
with significantly fewer assets in a given timeframe.  
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This lack of effectiveness rests squarely at the 
feet of non-adherence to joint TTP’s as set forth in JP 3-
09.3, (Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close 
Air Support). In an article in the March 2003 Marine Corps 
Gazette, several students from the Marine Corps Command and 
Staff College who had operational experience in OEF and OA 
highlighted many of the problems they faced while serving 
in the Afghan theatre of operations. Listed below is a 
synopsis of their observations (note: of the six Officers 
who contributed to the article, only two are from the U.S. 
Marine Corps, which may dispel any notion that it is 
strictly a parochial service-specific critique of OEF and 
OA): 
• Lack of understanding by the aircrew in regard to 
the commander’s intent and ground scheme of 
maneuver.27 
• No dedicated airborne Command & Control platform. 
The Air Force utilized the Airborne Warning and 
Control System (AWACS) aircraft for command and 
control of JCAS assets instead of the dedicated 
ABCCC (Airborne Battlefield Command and Control 
Center) platform. Since the AWACS aircraft lacks 
the specific on-board equipment used for the JCAS 
mission, it was ill-suited for the mission.28 
• No traditional control points were established to 
facilitate the expeditious use of tactical 
aircraft flowing into theatre. Contact Points 
(CP’s) are used by TacAir to check-in with 
terminal controllers and Initial Points (IP’s) 
are used by TacAir to start their attack runs 
into the target area. What was used in their 
place was a simple grid system that was 
previously used for Air Interdiction (AI) and 
Armed Reconnaissance (AR) in the initial phases 
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of OEF and OA but was inadequate for the 
execution of JCAS.29  
• Standard communication architecture was not 
utilized as prescribed in JP 3-09.3. Instead of 
each terminal controller being assigned a 
discrete frequency to control TacAir, a single 
frequency with multiple controllers was used. 
This created a dangerous environment for both 
aircraft and terminal controllers, which could 
have lead to mid air collisions and possible 
fratricide on the battlefield. This situation was 
due in large part to the requirement of the 
Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) in Saudi 
Arabia to monitor and approve all release 
authority in the Afghan theatre. This added a 
non-doctrinal and unnecessary layer of command 
and control on the air-to-ground operations that 
can lead to a non-doctrinally unsafe 
environment.30 
• Standard communication and brevity codes were 
either not used or misused and out of context. As 
an example, the use of the codeword ‘cleared 
hot’, a term strictly reserved for terminal 
controllers for the positive release of ordnance 
from TacAir, was used by the CAOC and AWACS 
aircraft. This lead to confusion since they were 
only using one TAD (Tactical Air Direction) 
frequency for multiple JCAS missions. Many pilots 
and/or terminal controllers were not sure who was 
issuing the ‘cleared hot’ call. This is probably 
the most dangerous of all the non-doctrinal JCAS 
situations that could happen on any battlefield. 
The potential for a pilot to mistakenly drop on a 
‘cleared hot’ call not from the terminal 
controller coordinating their specific mission 
could have easily lead to fratricide on the 
battlefield, or unnecessary civilian casualties.31 
• Lack of use of the JCAS standard 9-line briefing 
format. Although JP3-09.3 does not require the 
use of the 9-line brief in a permissive 
environment, much of the information contained in 








the brief is essential to give pilots the proper 
situational awareness (SA) in order to properly 
execute the JCAS mission. In OA it was too often 
disregarded, which led to longer loiter times 
over the target area by TacAir as well as 
increased time to accomplish the mission. Many 
sorties had to be re-routed to tanker aircraft 
due to the confusion created by insufficient 
information in the pre-mission brief. A greater 
use of the 9-line brief could have alleviated 
this target acquisition delay.32 
• Time-On-Target (TOT) not used. Although once 
again not required in a permissive CAS 
environment, the use of a TOT has the ancillary 
benefit of decreasing the time an aircraft spends 
over the target area. By not using a TOT, delays 
were experienced between aircraft check-in and 
target engagement, thereby decreasing the overall 
effectiveness of the JCAS mission.33 
• The lack of use of a ‘mark’ for target 
identification and the inefficiency of ‘talk-ons’ 
to get pilots eyes on the target area. Because 
coalition forces on the ground were primarily 
using lasers and GPS coordinates to mark targets, 
it was essential for ground controllers to give 
effective ‘talk-ons’ to the pilots to get their 
eyes on to the target area. A ‘talk-on’ is a 
technique where the terminal controller or GFAC 
geographically describes the target area to cage 
the pilot’s eyes onto the specific target they 
want the aircraft to destroy with their ordnance. 
This does several things. First, it is a safety 
measure to ensure the pilots are looking at the 
same target that the GFAC is and not at friendly 
forces. Secondly, it reconfirms to the pilot the 
electronic targeting data, either a laser spot or 
GPS spot, which he has or is receiving from the 
GFAC. And thirdly, it builds the pilot’s SA for 
the initial run-in to the target area. It was 
generally agreed upon at the OA JCAS conference 
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that the quality of ‘talk-ons’ could have been a 
lot better.34 
2. Recommendations         
The information provided by the after action reports 
from OEF and OA are indicative of the parochial 
relationships between the services, especially in the JCAS 
arena. JP 3-09.3 is not a new document and all the services 
have agreed upon its content. However, in the context of 
unconventional warfare, and specifically OEF and OA, it 
became apparent that conventional doctrine was disregarded 
because of the mistaken idea that the doctrine did not 
apply to the low intensity conflict or unconventional 
warfare. 
There are many cases where this can be argued but 
without a basic understanding of joint doctrine, (which 
appeared to be the case in many instances in OEF and OA), a 
departure point from doctrine is hard to define. 
Historically the services, although joint at the 
strategic and sometimes the operational level, operated in 
a very parochial manner with very service specific agendas. 
This did not cause much concern since the operating forces 
did not inter-mingle at the tactical level, but OEF and OA 
has changed all of that. US Army, Air Force, Navy and 
Marine Forces found themselves operating in the same area 
as well as using the same communication frequencies. This 
kind of joint operations is very quick to expose any 
differences between TTP’s, especially those that differ 
from JTTP’s. It is imperative that all joint forces adhere 
to joint doctrine and if there is a departure from joint 




doctrine, that it is for a compelling and logical reason 
and agreed upon by all participants. 
In the area of training, especially the USAF and USMC, 
the operating forces must ensure that the training that 
each service provides to its own terminal controllers is in 
accordance with joint doctrine. Simply put, the US Air 
Force and the US Marine Corps need to ensure that the 
tactics, techniques, and procedures taught at their service 
specific schools are the same so that no matter who is 
controlling joint aircraft in the future low intensity or 
unconventional conflict, they will have the same 
understanding of joint doctrine and procedures. If not, 
more confusion will exist on the battlefield at the joint 
level. This is obviously an unacceptable alternative.  
At the JCAS conference at Al-Jaber a USAF F-15 pilot 
gave his assessment of the JCAS conducted during OEF and 
OA. What is ironic is that an F-15, by doctrine, does not 
fly close air support missions, but they were pulled into 
service to fill critical gaps in the CAS mission in 
Afghanistan. Here is an excerpt from those comments: 
We Strike Eagle guys don’t do CAS. It is not a 
primary mission for us. We do not train to CAS. 
When we got over the AOR, we figured out that we 
needed to learn how to do it pretty quick. So we 
did some research, found some pubs, and prepared 
ourselves. We thought we were ready. When we got 
in country, the operations were nothing like what 
we had expected. We concur with almost everything 
that has been said here this morning. But we have 
a question. Is there any reason why we can’t just 
use this publication to fix the problems? Seems 
like most everything that folks are talking about 
is covered in this pub.35 
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At this point he held up JP 3-09.3.36  Until the need 
exists to deviate from already established joint tactics, 
techniques and procedures, current joint doctrine should 
remain in effect. Or simply put, why not use the manual 
that has all the answers? 
In the area of acquisitions, the services need to 
abide by the already established Joint Requirements 
Oversight Committees (JROC) of their specific area, (in 
this case the JCAS JROC), to ensure that the fielded 
equipment in all services is compatible with joint ground 
and air forces. There may be some growing pains in the near 
future as the services migrate towards this unity of high 
technology but if we are ever to truly operate as a 
cohesive joint force on the battlefield, we need to have 
commonality amongst the operating forces in the area of 
radios, lasers, GPS, and other high tech equipment specific 
to the close air support mission. Currently this is not the 
case. As described in the AA reports of OA at the post-JCAS 
conference, Special Operations Forces (SOF) were using off 
the shelf German-made laser range finders to quickly fix a 
target’s GPS coordinates. The US Marine forces did not have 
this same technology, so the same mission required valuable 
extra minutes for USMC terminal controllers to execute.37   
This is an unacceptable situation for several reasons. 
First, all forces should have the latest equipment to 
accomplish the mission and secondly, off-the-shelf 
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technology should have been fielded and tested at the 
service schools, not procured as a last minute fix to a 
technological deficiency. This may be a money issue and not 
in the scope of this critique but it points to a greater 
problem if the greatest Armed Forces in the world needs to 
go ‘shopping’ to buy essential equipment that can and 
should be provided to ALL our warfighters before they reach 
the battlefield. 
   
3. Conclusion     
In terms of military transformation in the area of 
joint close air support, it is apparent that we have the 
ability to change the way we do business and conduct 
training. How quickly we transform is another matter 
altogether. Parochialism in terms of training and execution 
at the joint level needs to be replaced with a greater 
desire to achieve jointness and adhere to already 
established doctrine, especially in the realm of 
unconventional warfare. It is here that joint doctrine can 
serve the joint forces most effectively by establishing a 
baseline of understanding from where deviations can take 
place. Without this common understanding of joint doctrine, 
any attempt to deviate from established doctrine can and 
will lead to confusion on the battlefield and an increased 
possibility of fratricide, the limiting of which, must be 






As stated previously, doctrinal misconceptions and 
misunderstandings can lead to confusion on the battlefield, 
but how different services come to the point of doctrinal 
departure is worthy of investigation. With this in mind, 
the following chapter will try to outline the major 
differences in how each service conducts it own air-to-
ground training with respect to both aircrew and ground 
controllers. With a better understanding of how each 
service trains it people in the close air support mission, 
it might then be easier to understand why we have problems 
operating in the joint environment, even though the 
doctrine is joint, and agreed upon beforehand. 
2. United States Air Force CAS Training  
The USAF conducts air-to-ground training at two 
primary sites, Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada and Eglin 
Air Force Base, which includes Hurlburt Field, in Florida.  
Located at Nellis Air Force Base is the Air-to-Ground 
Operations School, or AGOS. Within AGOS, the 6th Combat 
Training Squadron, or 6 CTS, is responsible for conducting 
training courses for the CAS mission. 6 CTS conducts the 
Terminal Attack Controller Course, or TACC, to train the 
Enlisted Terminal Attack Controller, or ETAC. At this 
course, the ETAC receives two weeks of classroom 
instruction with an additional week devoted to field 
operations and actual control of tactical aircraft at 
nearby Ft. Irwin’s live fire range. During the two-week 
classroom instruction, the ETAC is instructed in the 
tactical relationship between themselves, the U.S. Army 
units they may be assigned to, and the tactical aircraft 
they may control in support of ground operations. What may 
not be evident in this description is the fact that the 
44 
ETACs begin their instruction with little to no prior 
knowledge in the control of tactical aircraft and within 
three weeks time, are designated as representatives of the 
USAF to control tactical aircraft in the execution of the 
close air support mission. In fact, during their one-week 
training at Ft. Irwin’s live fire range, each student may 
graduate with as few as four ‘controls’ of tactical 
aircraft.38 A ‘control’ is defined as directing a tactical 
aircraft from its initial point of entry into the target 
area until it has completed its bombing run and returned to 
its starting point.   
In concert with the TACC course, AGOS also conducts 
courses to support the training of Air Force officers who 
will serve as Air Liaison Officers, or ALOs, to US Army 
units. ALOs and ETACs work closely together within their 
respective units to provide proper support to US Army 
units.39  
The AGOS School also conducts a one-week training 
course for airborne forward air controllers, or FAC(A). 
This course instructs USAF pilots in the mission of 
controlling tactical aircraft from an airborne platform in 
the conduct of the CAS mission. A FAC(A) will be utilized 
in the event that a ground terminal controller is unable to 
see a target and has requested the services of a FAC(A) to 
locate, acquire, and designate a target for attack by 
another aircraft.40  
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Although a pilot may attend the FAC(A) School at 
Nellis Air Force Base, they will receive their actual 
flight training back at their parent squadron.      
In addition to AGOS at Nellis, AFB, the USAF also 
conducts a considerable amount of CAS training at Hurlburt 
Field at Eglin AFB in Florida. The USAF Special Operations 
Squadrons are located here, including the AC-130 Specter 
Gunship squadrons. These squadrons conduct training with 
special operations units in support of US Special 
Operations Command missions and training requirements. An 
ETAC that has been designated to work with special 
operations forces will receive additional training at 
Hurlburt in the execution of CAS missions in support of 
Special Operations Forces. 
To complete the training picture that exists within 
the USAF, the actual ‘bomb droppers’, or tactical aircraft 
that will deliver ordnance in support of CAS operations 
will receive their training at their respective squadrons. 
Without going into detail of each training entity 
mentioned above, I want to highlight a general theme that 
exists in the CAS training environment: that CAS training 
within the Air Force is decentralized and multi-located. 
Ground controllers are being trained at Nellis Air Force 
Base and Eglin Air Force Base. Airborne controllers are 
school trained at Nellis but receive their in-flight 
training at their respective squadrons, and to complete the 
loop, CAS aircrews being trained at their respective 
squadrons.  
This type of decentralization within one service may 
lead us to understand why there may be a misunderstanding 
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of doctrine as it applies to the CAS mission. With so many 
venues providing training for the same mission, it is my 
opinion that it is inevitable that conflicting tactics, 
techniques, and procedures will be taught and subsequent 
conflict will arise between the training entities.  
Keep in mind that this is just one service that trains 
at multiple sites and how much more this scenario is likely 
to occur between the services and not just within the US 
Air Force. 
3. United States Marine Corps CAS Training 
Much like the Air Force, the Marine Corps also has 
multiple sites where it conducts CAS training. The primary 
location for the training of Forward Air Controllers, or 
FACs, the equivalent of the USAF ETAC, is conducted at the 
Expeditionary Warfare Training Groups, both on the east 
coast, known as EWTGLANT, and the west coast, known as 
EWTGPAC. EWTGLANT has its home in Little Creek, VA and 
conducts its live fire training at Marine Corps Base Camp 
Lejeune, NC. EWTGPAC is located in San Diego, CA on 
Coronado Island and conducts its live fire training at 
Marine Corps Base Twenty-Nine Palms, CA. 
Although located at dual sites, EWTG conducts the same 
training for FACs at both locations. The major difference 
between the two schools is the type of terrain that the 
students actually control tactical aircraft from. Camp 
Lejeune is primary a flat wooded area with little to no 
terrain difference while 29 Palms is located in the heart 
of the Mojave Desert and has wide open desert terrain 
coupled with some rugged mountainous terrain.  
The course syllabus consists of two weeks of classroom 
training followed by one week of field training, much like 
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the TACC School for ETACs. Both locations teach from an 
identical syllabus and there is no appreciable difference 
between the pilots who graduate from the east or west coast 
school. What is significant, in regard to their Air Force 
counterparts, is that they are all designated pilots and/or 
naval flight officers. In addition, each graduate is 
required by the Training and Readiness Manual, Volume 9, or 
T&R Vol. 9, to control twelve tactical missions before they 
graduate. If you take into account the fact that USMC FACs 
are designated aircrew in concert with their twelve mission 
sortie requirement and compare them with their Air Force 
ETAC counterparts from the TACC, who receive, on average, 
four terminal controls before they graduate, it is easy to 
see the disparate training and level of proficiency that 
exists between the two services. That is not to say that 
the Marine Corps is without its detractors in the CAS 
arena. Mentioned above is only the training that aircrew 
receive when they will be assigned to a ground unit as a 
FAC. 
Another aspect of Marine Corps TACP training at EWTG 
includes the addition of other supporting arms such as 
artillery, mortars and naval gunfire. Each student is 
required to become proficient in the standard call for fire 
for each type of supporting arms. This is not that case 
with the USAF AGOS. While the training a FAC receives in 
calling in supporting arms is not the primary focus of TACP 
school, it has the ancillary benefit of making FACs that 
graduate from EWTG a ‘universal spotter’, or someone who 
can call in all forms of supporting arms, not just CAS 
aircraft.  
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What is most important to note between USAF and USMC 
training is not which training program is better but to 
realize that each service has different requirements, 
objectives, tactics, techniques and procedures, even though 
both services agree upon the concepts and tactics as set 
forth in JP 3-09.3. If we were to fight as parochial 
services and not intermingle as a joint force, this might 
not be of significant interest, but when operating in the 
joint environment, this can become the proverbial ‘straw 
that broke the camel’s back’ in this author’s opinion. The 
need for a single source, joint schoolhouse has never been 
greater in the context of the War on Terrorism and our 
ability to operate as a cohesive fighting force on the 
joint battlefield.  
What will be covered in the following paragraphs is 
the training that CAS aircrew and FAC(A)’s receive, and the 
potential conflicts that may arise from their different 
training objectives and programs of certification. 
 
4. USAF CAS & FAC(A) Aircrew Training 
The United States Air Force provides three basic 
airframes for the close air support mission, the F-16 
Falcon, the A-10 Warthog and the AC-130 Specter Gunship. 
These aircraft and their crew are responsible for providing 
close air support to the U.S. Army, joint and coalition 
forces as the theatre or component commander directs. What 
is interesting to note about this is that during recent 
conflicts in Afghanistan, several more airframes were added 
to the mix of ‘close air support’ aircraft that had not 
previously been assigned that type of mission. Included in 
these were the B-52, B-1, and B-2 bombers as well as the F-
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15 Strike Eagle. Though not normally employed as a close 
air support asset, these airframes and their aircrew 
provided invaluable support to SOF forces on the ground in 
Afghanistan that helped to turn the tide of many battles 
against Taliban and al-Qaeda forces.  
What is within the scope of this paper is not who 
directs these assets in the accomplishment of their close 
air support mission but rather how they are trained and 
certified to deliver ordnance in support of the ground 
forces that they are flying close air support for. 
Most of the training received by these ad-hoc 
airframes that flew close air support missions was on the 
job training; that is to say, they had very little formal 
training back in CONUS in the execution of the close air 
support mission. 
The A-10, AC-130 and F-16 squadrons within the USAF 
are normally assigned the CAS mission and it is safe to say 
that they were the only squadrons deployed to the Afghan 
Theatre that had received prior CAS mission training to 
such a degree that could be called commensurate with 
Mission Essential Task Lists or METLs. 
Typical training for F-16, AC-130 or A-10 aircrews 
consists of squadron-based training as part of a close air 
support training package that each pilot would normally 
receive during their standard combat training phase.   
The one item of note for this would be that each 
squadron may train to the close air support mission with 
different levels of proficiency and adherence to doctrine. 
This is most likely the case with any squadron, service-
wide, that trains for this specific mission. I only point 
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it out here to highlight the need for strict adherence to 
joint doctrine when training at the squadron level. This 
becomes imperative when joint service aircraft are flying 
in support of joint forces on the ground. If a ground 
controller operating in the Afghan Theatre is awaiting the 
arrival of a section of close air support aircraft and they 
do not know if a USAF F-16 or a USMC F-18 or a USN F-14 
will show up on station to provide them close air support, 
it only makes sense that the doctrine employed and 
understood by the aircrew be exactly the same so that the 
ground controller, who also needs to know, understand and 
employ doctrine, can safely execute the mission at hand. 
If the USAF continues to use the B-52, B-1, B-2, and 
F-15 in the non-traditional role of a close air support 
platform, it is imperative that these airframes and their 
aircrew be assimilated into the close air support mission 
training that the USAF oversees and that that training 
adhere to joint doctrine to the maximum extent possible. 
In addition, during OEF and OA, the Army’s AH-64 
Apache helicopter was also used in the close air support 
mission. This is not normally the case as the Apache is 
typically utilized in a maneuver capacity with a battalion-
sized element. I only mention it here to stress the same 
edict, that if they are to be used in the CAS mission, they 
need to train to the same standard as those platforms 
traditionally used in the CAS mission. Currently, this is 
not the case and needs to be addressed and remedied if they 





5. USMC CAS & FAC(A) Aircrew Training 
The U.S. Marines have two fixed-wing and two rotary-
wing aircraft that can fly in support of the CAS mission. 
The F-18 and the AV-8B are fixed-wing assets and the AH-1W 
and the UH-1N are rotary-wing platforms that can all 
execute the CAS mission for Marine and Joint Forces 
deployed around the globe. 
The training that aircrew in these respective 
airframes receive in the execution of the CAS and FAC(A) 
mission is delineated in Marine Corps Order P3500.37, the 
Aviation Training and Readiness Manual.41 In addition to the 
T&R Manual, the Marine Corps also has several publications 
that support CAS training. These include but are not 
limited to the Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 
3-23.1, Close Air Support, and the MCWP XXXX, Supporting 
Arms Observer, Spotter, and Controller. Most of the 
information detailed in these two publications is derived 
from JP 3-09.3, Joint Close Support. This is pointed out to 
express a simple idea that each service has its own 
publications that are derived from the joint publications 
dealing with armed conflict, and more specifically, the 
close air support mission. If this is the case, do the 
services really need to have a separate publication for the 
execution of the CAS mission or is JP 3-09.3 sufficient for 
all the services? It is the position of this thesis that JP 
3-09.3 is sufficient for any service-member, regardless of 
the uniform they wear, to execute the CAS mission, and that 
the addition of service specific publications such as MCWP 
3-23.1, could lead to doctrinal conflict when operating in 
the joint environment. It is essential for all services to 
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default to the joint publication, in this case, JP 3-09.3, 
when operating with joint forces.  
 
6. USN CAS & FAC(A) Aircrew Training  
The United States Navy is very similar to its approach 
of CAS training as its’ sister service, the U.S. Marines. 
Those airframes and aircrew designated to provide close air 
support, (in this case, the F-18 and F-14), accomplish 
training in the CAS mission under the umbrella of squadron-
based training. As part of any pilot’s training program, 
the CAS mission is part of their combat training 
qualification phase. Again, the emphasis here is that each 
squadron accomplishes its own training in the course of a 
normal training rotation and no service specific 
qualification is necessary for a USN aircrew to drop 
ordnance in support of engaged ground forces. That is to 
say that Navy pilots will undergo squadron training to 
receive their CAS qualification as set forth by U.S. Navy 
Aviation requirements for the conduct of CAS, but a 
squadron is not, on a normal basis or interval, required to 
validate its own training program above the squadron level. 
The Navy is not alone in this aspect. In fact, all of the 
services conduct CAS mission training at the squadron level 
and are not normally evaluated above that level. The end 
result of this examination of training objectives is that 
it is virtually impossible to certify that all pilots, from 
all squadrons, from all the services, who fly the CAS 
mission, are training to the same standards. If this is the 
case, how do we ensure that any pilot flying the CAS 
mission in support of joint forces is executing the mission 




What then should the services do to streamline each of 
its’ own training program to mirror joint doctrine? As a 
matter of safety and preserving lives on the battlefield, I 
feel it is each services duty to ensure that we are all on 
the same ‘sheet of music’ so that no matter who is on the 
ground and no matter who is in the air, that we can operate 
together as a cohesive joint force and accomplish the 
mission at hand. This can only truly be accomplished if we 
adhere and train to joint standards as set forth in already 
established publications and if the need arises to change 
doctrine, that it be accomplished jointly and on the 
training field - not the battlefield - as was the case 
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V. JCAS RECOMMENDATIONS 
The joint force has made significant progress 
toward achieving an optimum level of 
interoperability, but there must be a concerted 
effort toward continued improvement. Further 
improvements will include the refinement of joint 
doctrine as well as further development of common 
technologies and processes. Exercises, personnel 
exchanges, agreement on standardized operating 
procedures, individual training and education, 
and planning will further enhance and 
institutionalize these capabilities. 
      
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Joint Vision 2020 
 
A. OVERVIEW 
During the past two years the U.S. Military has been 
engaged in the War on Terrorism on two distinct levels. The 
first of which has been the area of low intensity conflict 
operations such as Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation 
Anaconda in Afghanistan. The second has been the more 
conventional level of conflict as seen in recent actions in 
Operation Iraqi Freedom. While both Afghanistan and Iraq 
have involved U.S forces who’s mission has been, among 
others, that of regime change, and the broader mission of 
the continuing War on Terrorism, each military operation 
posed unique challenges to our doctrinal concepts of close 
air support. 
In OEF and OA, U.S. military forces have been 
primarily engaged in the low intensity conflict utilizing 
the revolutionary Special Operations Forces model of 
warfare - that of providing assistance to indigenous forces 
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to overthrow an existing government that is anathema to 
U.S. foreign interests. 
In contrast to this, Operation Iraqi Freedom was a 
conventional conflict at least in terms of major battles 
fought against the regular Iraqi Army and Republican Guard 
units. Both types of conflict utilized and continue to 
utilize the overwhelming superiority of U.S. airpower, and 
to a lesser extent the airpower of various coalition 
partners in the War on terrorism. 
How U.S. airpower is applied, and more specifically 
how U.S. airpower is applied in the joint close air support 
arena, has been significantly different between the low 
intensity and conventional environments.  
This difference begs several overarching questions in 
regard to close air support application in the low 
intensity conflict. Do we need to apply the same joint 
close air support doctrine in the LIC as we do in a 
conventional conflict? If not, do we need to develop a 
separate doctrine for JCAS in the LIC as opposed to the 
conventional conflict, and if so, how do we implement and 
validate such doctrinal changes? 
Military Transformation pundits have postulated new 
concepts to transform our military so we can fight smarter, 
smaller, and quicker utilizing our technological advantage 
over the majority of the world today. Two such 
transformation ‘buzzwords’ include Precision Engagement 
(PE) and Decisive Maneuver (DM).42   
In the JCAS arena, PE and DM have particularly 
relevant application, as it is essential to the success of 
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any close air support mission to maneuver decisively and 
then rapidly engage the target with precision delivered 
munitions. Joint Vision 2020 addresses the PE and DM 
concepts in general terms but the ‘how to’ in the JCAS 
arena has been overlooked, in this author’s opinion. 
Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Anaconda have 
provided us with some valuable lessons that can help us to 
transform our JCAS doctrine and then to validate its 
authority with joint training concepts such as the Joint 
National Training Center model. 
 
B. JOINT COMMAND AND CONTROL  
1. Overview 
During recent hostilities in Afghanistan, several 
deficiencies and shortfalls arose during the execution 
phase of OEF and OA and still continue to plague U.S. 
Special Operations Forces in the Afghan theatre. 
As detailed in the OEF and OA JCAS conference, listed 
below are some of the highlighted areas of concern from the 
after action reports and lessons learned from OEF and OA in 
regard to close air support execution:43 
• Lack of understanding of Commander’s Intent. 
• No dedicated Command & Control platform. 
• No traditional Control Points (CP) were used. 
• Standard Communications architecture not used. 
• Standard communications and brevity codes not used. 
• Lack of use of JCAS 9-line brief. 
• Time-on-Target not used. 
• No standard target mark was used. 
                     
43
 Marine Corps Gazette, “Tower of Babel: Joint Close Air Support in 
OEF”, Mar 2003, pp 34-35 
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• Lack of good ‘talk-on’ by ground controllers. 
 
These are just some of the items that were addressed 
at the conference, and it must be noted that not all of 
these items applied to all of the missions. Merely, they 
were general trends that were noticed by aircrew and ground 
personnel alike, and hampered their ability to execute the 
mission as seamlessly as they would have liked. It must 
also be mentioned that these items did not prevent U.S. SOF 
personnel from accomplishing their mission but only made it 
more difficult and sometimes resulted in a Time Sensitive 
Target (TST) escaping destruction. This is something that 
can and should be avoided at all costs, especially with the 
possible strategic and political ramifications of a failed 
mission. 
Though these deficiencies were overcome by SOF forces 
on the ground and by aircrew flying the missions, this by 
no means indicates that the problems have been fixed or are 
in accordance with current doctrine. This leads us back to 
the question of ‘Do we need to change our current JCAS 
doctrine for low intensity conflict operations’, or do we 
simply need to adhere to and apply current doctrine?  
2. Terminal Clearance Authority 
As discussed earlier in this paper, the command and 
control that was exercised during OEF and OA was, at times, 
in direct conflict with JCAS doctrine. Specifically, the 
approval to drop ordnance in close proximity to ground 
forces rests squarely on the shoulders of the ground combat 
element commander as outlined in JP 3-09.3.44 However, in 
                     
44
 JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air 
Support (CAS), Washington: GPO, 1995, pp V-9 
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OEF and OA, that control was exercised from the CAOC in 
Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. It must be noted that there were 
political and strategic considerations for this but the 
point of this paper is to highlight that the CAS missions 
flown during OEF and OA were not IAW current doctrine; if 
this is necessitated by considerations above the tactical 
commander on the battlefield, it needs to be delineated 
beforehand. If not, the missed opportunities to prosecute 
time sensitive targets will continue to hamper an operation 
such as OEF if the Rules of Engagement are not delineated 
down to the lowest possible chain of command. 
3. Lack of Multiple Tactical Air Direction Nets 
The approval to drop on requested targets rested at 
the highest levels in Riyadh, and led to another command 
and control problem: that of a limited number of terminal 
control frequencies in relation to the number of terminal 
controllers on the battlefield. Because the CAOC was the 
approving authority for ‘drop’ clearance, multiple ground 
controllers were utilizing the same frequency for terminal 
control. This is again in direct conflict with joint 
doctrine that states that every terminal controller will 
have a discrete frequency, or Tactical Air Direction (TAD) 
Net, in order to prosecute targets in their specific AOR.45 
This single frequency allows the terminal controller to 
control and execute the CAS mission without interference or 
impediment from other controllers. The mission approval 
comes directly from the ground combat element commander 
that they are supporting. 
 
 
                     
45
 Ibid, pp II-3 
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4. Who is the GCE Commander in a LIC environment 
like OEF? 
This brings up another interesting point regarding OEF 
and OA, which is the simple fact that terminal controllers 
were typically attached to SOF units that were, at times, 
working alongside Northern Alliance Forces. Since the 
Northern Alliance Forces had the preponderance of combat 
power on the ground, were they considered the ‘ground 
combat element’, and was their leader considered the GCE 
Commander? To U.S. SOF personnel, this was certainly not 
the case, as they were working directly for USSOCOM, even 
though they were providing CAS for the Northern Alliance 
Forces. 
When OEF transitioned to the OA aspect and terminal 
controllers were now under the command of U.S. Forces, the 
procedures for requesting CAS did not change and it is here 
that the most confusion occurred. The CAOC in Riyadh should 
have transitioned approval authority back to its rightful 
location, that of the GCE Commander. Since this did not 
happen, multiple controllers were using only a few 
frequencies to control CAS assets, leading to confusion and 
frustration on the battlefield. 
5. Joint Command & Control Architecture 
Currently each service has its own C&C system to allow 
it to execute the close air support mission. The USMC has 
the MACCS (Marine Air Command and Control System), the USN 
has NTACS (Navy Tactical Air Command and Control System), 
the USA has the AAGS (Army Air Ground System), and the USAF 
has the TACS (Theatre Air Control System.  
It would seem that in this current climate of joint 
operations that each service could agree on a joint C&C 
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system. When a JTF is established and the JTF commander 
picks his Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC), 
whose C&C system is to be utilized? Is it one, some or all 
of the services? In OEF, you had Navy tactical aircraft 
flying from the CVBG’s under NTACS, Marine tactical 
aircraft flying off the ARG’s under the MACCS and USAF 
tactical aircraft flying out of points within the Persian 
Gulf under the TACS system. It could be argued that a joint 
air command and control system could be utilized by all the 
services so that they don’t have to switch from one to the 
other as they transition in and out of the respective air 
traffic control areas. This thesis’ contribution to joint 
command & control would be the JTACCS or Joint Tactical Air 
Command and Control System. This would enable any service 
to ‘plug’ into JTACCS from anywhere in the world, whether 
from a NAVY CVBG or ARG, a USAF Expeditionary Airfield, or 
an Army or Marine Corps Forward Operating Base. 
6. Conclusion 
Up to now we have discussed JCAS at the inter-service 
level, assuming falsely sometimes, that service specific 
training in the JCAS arena is standardized. It could be 
argued that this is not necessarily the case. If change is 
required and the amount of change is established, how then 
do we validate any new doctrinal issues in training so our 
fighting men and women are not ‘learning on the job’ during 
the next conflict? In the following section, training 
issues will be addressed to offer possible solutions to new 






C. TRAINING TRANSFORMATION 
1. Overview 
As stated previously, doctrinal misconceptions and 
misunderstandings can lead to confusion on the battlefield, 
but how different services arrive at the point of doctrinal 
departure is, in this author’s opinion, directly related to 
parochial style training. In order to avoid the same 
pitfalls experienced in Operation Enduring Freedom, joint 
training needs to become the rule, not the exception. By 
transforming the way we train - to a joint standard, with 
joint forces, and in accordance with joint doctrine - we 
will better serve our own joint requirements. ‘Re-inventing 
the wheel’ is something we do routinely in the joint arena 
and until we truly transform the way we do business, it is 
likely to continue.  
The proceeding items listed below are some of the ways 
we can address joint training shortfalls. It must be noted, 
however, though this is by no means a comprehensive list, 
only a starting point that will allow our joint forces to 
tackle the current problem of joint interoperability in the 
joint close air support arena. 
2. Joint National Training Center 
Several Military Transformation concepts could have 
helped and may help in the future execution of JCAS in the 
low intensity conflict. One such concept is the Joint 
National Training Center (JNTC). JNTC is a virtual 
connectivity concept that would allow battlefield 
commanders the opportunity to operate as part of a virtual 
‘joint force’ without the need to co-locate forces. As an 
example, U.S. Army Forces operating at the Joint Readiness 
Training Center at Ft. Polk, LA and U.S. Marine Forces 
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operating during annual training at Twenty-nine Palms, Ca, 
could operate as a larger, virtual force, under the 
umbrella of a larger, virtual operation. This could be 
accomplished at the same time these forces are conducting 
their normal annual training. Typically a Brigade Combat 
Team will take part in a JRTC rotation while a MEU-sized 
Marine Air Ground Task Force will take part in a Combined 
Arms Exercise (CAX) at 29 Palms. If both units were 
‘assigned’ to a larger, virtual unit, such as a Joint Task 
Force and tasked with a joint mission that accomplished the 
goals of a JRTC rotation or a CAX rotation, it could serve 
to validate, under the construct of operational 
experimentation, the JNTC concept. In this case, it would 
be the JCAS mission in the low intensity conflict. A JNTC 
training experimentation conducted with an OEF model could 
help future joint force commanders in working out the 
intricacies of JCAS when conducted in the low intensity 
conflict.  It would identify any deficiencies and trends 
over the course of several experimentations and allow for 
remedies before our joint forces were deployed. 
 
3. Transform Joint Training Mandate 
Unless a specific military command is given the 
mandate from the CJCS, it is my opinion that a training 
mandate to change the status quo likely will not happen. 
This is for a variety of reasons but the most compelling is 
the parochial and bureaucratic way in which the services do 
business.  
If a mandate were established by the CJCS, (and for 
the sake of this argument let us say it is the Joint Forces 
Command (JFCOM) that is tapped to produce a Joint Training 
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Program that all the services are required to accomplish), 
standardization amongst the services would quickly follow. 
 
4. Single Site Training for JCAS JTTP’s 
This might be the hardest item to sell to all the 
services and may be a ‘bridge too far’ but the fiscal 
savings alone might be enough motivation to get the 
services to train together at a joint schoolhouse. 
a. Fiscal Savings 
Currently there are two training sites in the 
U.S. Marine Corps: the Expeditionary Warfare Training Group 
Atlantic (EWTGLANT) in Little Creek, VA and the 
Expeditionary Warfare Training Group Pacific (EWTGPAC) in 
San Diego, CA. The USAF has two training sites as well, 
Nellis Air Force Base in Las Vegas, NV and Hurlburt Field 
at Eglin Air Force Base, FL. Additionally, the U.S. Navy 
has one training site, Naval Strike Aviation Warfare Center 
at Naval Air Station Fallon, NV. The fiscal savings alone 
that a single-site training complex would realize over the 
course of a fiscal year could easily persuade the most 
ardent parochialist to consider the financial benefits of 
such a shift.  
b. Inter-Service Familiarity 
Although some cross training does occur at each 
training site, the familiarity that each service member 
would be exposed to in terms of joint aircraft would be far 
ahead of the current state of cross-training and joint 
familiarity.  As an example, actual combat operations is 
not the ideal situation for an Air Force ETAC to see a Navy 
F/A-18 for the first time to provide him with close air 
support. Equally as untimely would be a U.S. Navy SEAL 
controlling an AC-130 Specter Gunship for the first time 
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during an extract under fire. What is compelling about 
these two scenarios is that they occurred on more than a 
few occasions during OEF and OA. It is imperative that our 
deployed forces see and employ the complete array of 
tactical aircraft during close air support while in 
training, not on the actual battlefield for the first time. 
The benefit of having all the services providing 
close air support assets to a single JCAS schoolhouse would 
be highly advantageous to ground controllers and aircrew 
alike. This is not just limited to tactical aircraft 
familiarity but also ordnance, weapon systems, target 




The task to truly become an interoperable joint force 
may seem to be a daunting task on the surface but there 
are, at least in the close air support context, several 
mainstream concepts, ideas and initiatives that will go a 
long way in developing our joint close air support 
interoperability. Joint command and control, joint training 
and adherence to joint doctrine are the main points that 
this paper is trying to draw to the reader’s attention. If 
these items were addressed fully and embraced by all the 
services, operations such as Afghanistan, Somalia and other 
low intensity conflicts would have been accomplished with 
greater speed and with less service friction. In the case 
of Joint Close Air Support in the low intensity conflict, 
this should be every Warfighter’s goal. 
Some might ask the question, “Why should the topic of 
Joint Close Air Support matter to a Marine Attack 
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Helicopter Pilot?”, since the Marine Corps has its own 
tactical aircraft to provide close air support for its own 
forces. This may seem like a logical question since the 
Marine Corps is the only service that does not provide 
operational forces to USSOCOM, but it does not address 
recent initiatives on the part of the Commandant of the 
Marine Corps to stand-up an operational reconnaissance 
force that will be under the operational control of 
USSOCOM.46 By tasking the newly formed unit, the US Marine 
Corps has come full circle in its effort to embrace the 
concept of joint interoperability, and as a result, U.S. 
Marine tactical aviation needs to adopt this new paradigm 
of operating in the joint arena. 
As a final note, and as described in the introduction 
of this thesis, the ability to deliver precision ordnance 
against hostile targets is not without risk to our own 
forces on the ground. Unless we embrace inter-service 
training and doctrinal adherence, we will most likely 
continue to injure and kill our own forces in future 
conflicts where we operate at the joint level, such as the 
current War on Terrorism. Since the War on Terrorism will 
not likely end any time soon, the status quo in Joint Close 
Air Support training and doctrine is unacceptable and needs 
to transform. At best we can accomplish future missions 
more safely with a joint system of training, doctrine and 
certification. At worst, we will continue to haunt 
ourselves in the form of needless deaths on the battlefield 
due to friendly fire.     
                     
46
 Perry, Tony, “Marines Set Aside Go it Alone Attitude”, Los Angeles 
Times, 12 May 2002, pp. 18 
67 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Air Land Sea Application Center (ALSA). J-Fire, Multi-
Service Procedures for the Joint Application of Firepower. 
Hampton, Virginia: ALSA, 1997. 
Biddle, Stephen. “Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare”, 
Foreign Affairs, March/April 2003, Volume 82 No. 2. 
Burgess, Mark, “Killing Your Own: The Problem of Friendly 
Fire during the Afghan Campaign”, Center for Defense 
Information (CDI), 12 June 2002.  
http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/killing.cfm. 
CJCSI 3900.01A Position Reference Procedures. Washington: 
GPO, 1998. 
Close Air Support (CAS) in 2025: "Computer, Lead's in Hot" 
[USAF 2025 study report] HTML version -- 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/2025/volume3/chap07/v3c7-1.htm    
Cyr, Mark R., Major, USMC. "United States Marine Corps 
Close Air Support, Revisited", Marine Corps University 
Command and Staff College, 1995 
http://198.65.138.161/military/library/report/1995/CMR.htm. 
Demonte, V., “Avoiding Fratricide: Is the Endgame Solution 
the Answer?”, Journal of Electronic Defense, No. 15, 1992. 
Department of the Army Safety Center Briefing, “Command 
Briefing of the Events Surrounding the JDAM Fratricide 
Incident of 5 December 2001”, 13 March 2001. 
Doton, LTC Larry, “Technology and Fratricide”, Acquisition 
Quarterly Review, Winter 1996. 
"Fratricide: Avoiding the Silver Bullet", Marine Corps 
University Command and Staff College, 1995  
http://198.65.138.161/military/library/report/1995/DJ.htm. 
Gibson, Mark J., LtCol, USMC, "USMC Close Air Support Must 
Be Complementary, Not Competitive", Marine Corps University 
Command and Staff College [1995] 
Goodman, Glenn W., “Close Air Support: Air Strikes On Enemy 
Troops Remain ‘Trump Card’ For Ground Force Commanders”, 
Armed Forces Journal International, January 2002.  
68 
Grier, Peter, “The Combination that Worked: Airpower and 
Space Communications”, Air Force Magazine, 85:30-32 April 
2002. 
Gruetzmacher, Jeffrey K., Holtery, Michelle J., Putney, 
Jonathan R., “Fratricide:  The Ultimate Cost Of Joint 
Interoperability Failure”, Joint Forces Staff College, 11 
June 2002. 
Hewish, Mark, “US Air Force Eyes Next Revolution in Close 
Air Support.” Jane’s International Defense Review (JIDR),  
October, 2000. 
Jones, Brian W., LtCol, USAF, “Close Air Support: A 
Doctrinal Disconnect”, Airpower Journal, Winter, 1992.  
JP 3-09, Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, Washington: GPO, 
1998. 
JP 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for 
Close Air Support (CAS), Washington: GPO, 1995. 
Kauchak, Marty, “Focus on OEF's Air Campaign”, Armed Forces 
Journal International, 139:20-22 March 2002.  
Meyers, Richard B., “A Word from the Chairman”, Joint 
Forces Quarterly, Summer 2002. 
Nathman, John B., "‘We Were Great’: Navy Air in 
Afghanistan”, U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 128:94-96 
March 2002.  
Naylor, Sean, “In Casualties' Wake, A Quest to Prevent 
Friendly Fire”, Air Force Times, 62:19 December 31, 2001.  




Putsam, Anil R., “Close Call for Close Air Support?”,  Air 
& Space Power Chronicles,  14 September 01 
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/pustam.
html. 
Rolfsen, Bruce, “Enduring Freedom to Act as Test for AEF 
(Air Expeditionary Force) Structure”, Air Force Times, 
62:14 October 15, 2001.  
69 
Roos, John G., “Long Reach: Battlefield Success Remains 
Rooted in All-Encompassing Support”, Armed Forces Journal 
International, 139 :30-32+ March 2002. 
Shaw, Gary P., Maj, USMC, "Gulf War Close Air Support: 
Implications for the Future", Marine Corps University 
Command and Staff College [1995] 
http://198.65.138.161/military/library/report/1995/SGP.htm. 
USTRADOC, Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), 














THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
71 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. Marine Corps Representative 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
4. Director, Training and Education, MCCDC, Code C46 
Quantico, Virginia 
 
5. Director, Marine Corps Research Center, MCCDC, C40RC 
Quantico, Virginia 
 
6. Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity (Attn: 
     Operations Officer) 
Camp Pendleton, California  
 
7. LtCol Greg Mislick 
Operations Research Department, Code 30 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, CA 
 
 
 
